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I. INTRODUCTION

A child’s access to justice is predicated on the assumption that
the subject of the proceeding, the child, will have legal
representation to petition the court and have a voice in the
proceeding. Two notable United States Supreme Court cases are
emblematic of children’s access to justice, marked as they are by
the Court’s pronouncement that “[t]he right to representation by
counsel is not a formality. It is not a grudging gesture to a
1
ritualistic requirement. It is the essence of justice.”
2
The 1967 landmark case, In re Gault, established that children
have a constitutional right to counsel in delinquency proceedings.
3
Gault followed Kent v. United States where the United States
Supreme Court held that children may not be transferred from
juvenile court to criminal court without a hearing in which they are
† Executive Director, Children’s Law Center of Minnesota, Member, ABA
Section of Litigation Children’s Law Committee Working Group, William Mitchell
College of Law, J.D. magna cum laude, Simmons College School of Social Work, M.
Sc. in Social Work, Wellesley College, B. A. Ms. Bohr was Editor and Executive
Editor of William Mitchell Law Review. She clerked for retired Minnesota Supreme
Court Justice A. M. “Sandy” Keith and was an associate at Faegre & Benson. She
served on the Minnesota Supreme Court Foster Care and Adoption Task Force
and on the Minnesota Supreme Court Juvenile Protection Rules Committee. In
addition to representing children in court, she serves on the Children’s Justice
Initiative Committees in both Hennepin and Ramsey counties and the Ramsey
County Combined Jurisdiction Advisory Committee.
1. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561 (1966).
2. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
3. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
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4

represented by counsel. While Gault involved the delinquent act
5
of making a “lewd or indecent” telephone call, it led to an
examination of procedural due process rights in other proceedings
involving children, especially in dependency (child protection)
6
proceedings. The court in Gault noted:
The right of the state, as parens patriae, to deny to the child
procedural rights available to his elders was elaborated by
the assertion that a child, unlike an adult, has a right ‘not
to liberty but to custody’. . . . On this basis, proceedings
involving juveniles were described as ‘civil’ not ‘criminal’
and therefore not subject to the requirements which
restrict the state when it seeks to deprive a person of his
7
liberty.
Nevertheless, because delinquency proceedings could result in
the loss of liberty for the juvenile, the Court held that children
have a right to counsel in all proceedings in which an adverse
8
finding may result in incarceration.
As “the essence of justice,” the right to representation is not
limited to delinquent behavior; indeed, even in dependency or
child protection proceedings, the state may place the child with
strangers, away from home, family and relatives, often against his or
her will—resulting in a loss of liberty. While Kent and Gault dealt
with delinquent behavior characterized as “neither criminal nor
civil,” they provide the underpinnings for the representation of
9
counsel for children in dependency proceedings.
Indeed, the Gault Court’s reliance on the Report by the
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration
of Justice The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (1967) is instructive.
The Report stated:
The Commission believes that no single action holds
more potential for achieving procedural justice for the
child in the juvenile court than provision of counsel. The
presence of an independent legal representative of the
child, or of his parent, is the keystone of the whole
4. Gault, 387 U.S. at 36.
5. Id. at 4.
6. See Susan A. Snyder, Promises Kept, Promises Broken: An Analysis of Children’s
Right to Counsel in Dependency Proceedings in Pennsylvania, 1 JUVENILE LAW CENTER
(2001).
7. Gault, 387 U.S. at 17.
8. Id. at 41.
9. See Catherine J. Ross, From Vulnerability to Voice: Appointing Counsel for
Children in Civil Litigation, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1571, 1579 (1996).
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structure of guarantees that a minimum system of
procedural justice requires.
Fears have been expressed that lawyers would make
juvenile court proceedings adversary. No doubt this is
partly true, but it is partly desirable. Informality is often
abused . . . . And in all cases children need advocates to
speak for them and guard their interests, particularly
when disposition decisions are made. It is the disposition
stage at which the opportunity arises to offer
individualized treatment plans and in which the danger
inheres that the court’s coercive power will be applied
without adequate knowledge of the circumstances.
The Commission recommends: Counsel should be
appointed as a matter of course wherever coercive action
is a possibility, without requiring any affirmative choice by
10
child or parent.
At the time of the report, Minnesota was one of a few states
that already gave the “minor, parent, guardian or custodian the
11
right to counsel.” As a result, when the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar
Association approved the Uniform Juvenile Court Act in 1968,
Minnesota was not among the states that adopted the Uniform
12
Juvenile Court Act.

10. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 38-40 n.65 (quoting PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A
FREE SOCIETY 86-87 (1967).
11. In 1959, Minnesota adopted the Juvenile Court Act, which on the subject
of appointment of counsel stated, “The minor, parent, guardian or custodian have
the right to counsel. If they desire counsel but are unable to employ it, the court
shall appoint counsel to represent the minor or his parents or guardian in any
other case in which it feels that such appointment is desirable.” 1959 Minn. Laws,
ch. 685, subd. 2, 1288. The Act made no distinction between delinquency and
child protection proceedings.
Indeed, delinquency and child protection
proceedings were combined in the juvenile code until 1999 when the juvenile
delinquency provisions of the Juvenile Court Act were codified in chapter 260B
and the child protection provisions of the Juvenile Court Act were codified in
chapter 260C. The Gault Court cited Minnesota as one of “a few states” that
required advising the child of the right to counsel and to have counsel appointed.
Gault, 387 U.S. at 37 n.63 (citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.155(2) (Supp. 1966)
(replaced by MINN. STAT. §§ 260B.163, 260C.163 (2000)).
12. Minnesota had a connection to the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws: the late William Mitchell College of Law
Professor Maynard Pirsig was Chair of the Commission in 1968.
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II. OUTLINE OF ARTICLE
Despite the foresight of the 1959 Minnesota Legislature in
giving children the right to counsel in juvenile court, the reality of
children’s access to justice in 2001 falls short of this promising start.
This article will discuss systemic and substantive issues that have
implications for children’s access to justice in Minnesota. The
child’s right to counsel in delinquency proceedings is not within
the scope of this article.
Systemically, there are funding and policy issues related to
providing lawyers for children. In juvenile protection proceedings
where the state/county is the petitioner, even where there is
agreement that children have the right to counsel, there is not
enough funding to pay lawyers to represent children. In custody
proceedings in Family Court, where the litigants are private parties,
on the other hand, there is disagreement about whether children
should have a voice in the proceedings. Indeed there is no
statutory right to counsel.
Substantively, a recent change in the Minnesota Juvenile
Protection Rules has affected a child’s access to justice. The
amended rule provides that the child who is the subject of a
13
juvenile protection matter is a participant, not a party, resulting in
lesser procedural rights for the child.
Finally, this article will discuss the Standards for Legal
Representation of Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases promulgated by
the American Bar Association. Providing “high quality legal
representation” to children is the goal of these standards; achieving
that goal will go far to improve access to justice for children.
III. JUVENILE PROTECTION PROCEEDINGS
Juvenile protection proceedings are civil proceedings where
the state/county is the petitioner and the parent is the respondent.
The child, as the subject of the proceeding, has an interest in the
outcome of the proceeding and has a right to legal counsel. The
Kent and Gault decisions are reminders that when there is state
action and the power of the state can be brought to bear on
decisions affecting the child in profound ways such as where and
14
with whom the child will live, counsel for the child is imperative.

13.
14.

MINN. R. JUV. PRO. 58.01 (2000).
Gault, 387 U.S. at 1; Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 541 (1966).
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Since the 1959 Juvenile Court Act, not only has Minnesota
continued to give children the right to counsel, it has been explicit
about what kind of counsel: “The child, parent, guardian or
custodian has the right to effective assistance of counsel in connection
15
with a proceeding in juvenile court.” In addition, the statute is
prescriptive: “Counsel for the child shall not also act as the child’s
16
guardian ad litem.”
Yet, in a move that circumscribed children’s access to justice,
the statute was amended in 2000 to limit appointment of counsel to
children ten years of age or older. “[I]f the child desires counsel
but is unable to employ it, the court shall appoint counsel to
represent the child who is ten years of age or older . . . in any case
17
in which it feels such an appointment is appropriate.”
The amendment is indicative of the systemic impediments to
providing representation to children. Until 2000, when children in
child protection proceedings had the right to counsel without
18
regard to age, the state did not provide sufficient funding to
ensure vindication of that right. Consequently, many children did
not get lawyers. If they did, in some counties they often did not
have continuity of representation because they had a different
lawyer for each hearing thereby compromising the quality of the
representation.
In 1998, there were 18,854 children in out of home

15. MINN. STAT. § 260C.163, subd. 3(a) (2000) (emphasis added). The
effective assistance of counsel standard comports with the “quality representation”
and “high quality representation” described in the STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR
LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES (American Bar
Assoc. 1996) (adopted by the ABA House of Delegates on February 5, 1996) and
the “competent representation” referred to in NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND
FAMILY COURT JUDGES, RESOURCE GUIDELINES: IMPROVING COURT PRACTICE IN CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECT CASES 22 (1995).
16. MINN. STAT. § 260C.163 subd. 3(c). While Minnesota has been clear that
the lawyer for the child cannot also be the guardian ad litem, in other states, such
as Pennsylvania, guardians ad litem must be an attorney at law and represent both
the legal and best interests of the child. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6311(a); see
generally ABA Standards, supra note 15, ABA Standard A-1 (stating “[t]he term
‘child’s attorney’ means a lawyer who provides legal services for a child and who
owes the same duties of undivided loyalty, confidentiality, and competent
representation to the child as is due an adult client.”).
17. MINN. STAT. § 260C.163 subd. 3(b).
18. There is agreement that all children in child protection proceedings have
legal rights that need protection. For a full discussion on the appointment of
counsel for every child see Minnesota Supreme Court Foster Care and Adoption Task
Force Final Report, 102-06 (1997) [hereinafter Adoption Task Force].
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placements in Minnesota.
Other than a few non-profit
20
organizations, representation for children in child protection
proceedings is provided by the public defender system, a system
primarily geared towards criminal proceedings. In a six county
survey conducted by the Minnesota Supreme Court Foster Care
and Adoption Task Force in 1997, the major metropolitan
counties, Hennepin and Ramsey, showed very low rates of attorney
representation for children; 5% for Hennepin County and 6% for
21
Ramsey County. Otter Tail and Anoka Counties had the highest
rate of attorney representation for children.
Besides the unavailability of counsel for children, the child’s
right to effective assistance of counsel can be compromised when
juvenile court and family court matters are combined. For
example, when custody proceedings are between two divorcing
parents—private parties—the child, one of the subjects of the
proceeding, does not generally have standing to be heard in court
22
and there is no statutory right to counsel. Indeed, one might
argue that the same rationale for providing lawyers in juvenile
protection matters does not pertain in family court matters because
the state is not involved in the potential removal of the child from
the family or the custodial parent.
In some instances, however, juvenile protection matters are
combined with family court matters, and counsel is appointed for
the child because of the child protection issues. Despite the
appointment, some judges decide not to hear what the child’s
express wishes are with regard to where the child wants to live.
When the judge makes a decision a priori not to hear from the child
or even consider the child’s wishes, it is difficult not to conclude

19. CHILDREN’S DEFENSE FUND, MINNESOTA KIDS: A CLOSER LOOK, 2001 DATA
BOOK 31 (2001).
20. The Youth Law Project of Legal Aid of Minneapolis, Children’s Law
Center of Minnesota, and Centro Legal are among the few Minnesota non-profit
organizations that represent children in CHIPS and TPR proceedings.
21. See Adoption Task Force, supra note 18 and accompanying text. Since the
survey conducted in 1997, Children’s Law Center of Minnesota’s representation of
over 350 children in CHIPS and TPR proceedings in Ramsey County changes this
6% figure. Id. On the other hand, Children’s Law Center of Minnesota’s
representation of state wards in Hennepin County will not change the 5% figure
because state wards were not entitled to representation before 1997. Id.
22. Under permissive intervention, the child has sometimes been allowed to
intervene to be heard in court. Property distribution and child custody are among
the subjects in divorce proceedings in family court.
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that the child’s access to justice is diminished.

IV. PARTY VERSUS PARTICIPANT STATUS OF THE CHILD
Whether or not the child is a party in juvenile protection
proceedings affects the child’s access to justice. On March 1, 2000,
the newly amended Minnesota Juvenile Protection Rules came into
24
effect. Until then, the Rules had not been amended since their
enactment in December 1982. While a body of case law has not yet
developed regarding the amended Juvenile Protection Rules, there
is one rule that has due process and access to justice implications
for children who are the subject of a child in need of protection or
services (“CHIPS”) proceeding or a termination of parental rights
(“TPR”) petition. This rule provides that the child who is the
subject of a juvenile protection matter is a participant, not a party, in
25
the juvenile protection matter.
The distinction between participant and party status has
created a new issue for lawyers appointed to represent children in
juvenile protection proceedings. While it may not be obvious,
there are significant differences between the two designations. A
child who is a party has all the rights usually associated with those
involved in litigation, including: the right to receive notice, have
legal representation, be present at all hearings, conduct discovery,
bring motions before the court, participate in settlement
26
agreements, and otherwise participate in the action. In contrast,
the rights of a participant are limited to receiving notice, attending
27
hearings, and offering information at the discretion of the court.
The Advisory Committee Comment to the Participant Status
Rule, Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Procedure 58.01, notes that
“[t]he former rules did not distinguish between parties and

23. While having a lawyer does not guarantee that the child will get his or her
wish with regard to where he or she will live, having a lawyer should mean that the
judge will at least listen to the child’s concerns even if the judge subsequently does
not grant the request. To do otherwise conjures up Dean Pound’s vision of
juvenile court in 1937, “The powers of the Star Chamber were a trifle in
comparison with those of our juvenile courts.” In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18(1967).
24. The author was a member of the Minnesota Supreme Court Juvenile
Protection Rules Committee that assisted in drafting the amended Juvenile
Protection Rules.
25. MINN. R. JUV. PRO. 58.01.
26. Id. at 57.02.
27. Id. at 58.02, subd. 1.
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28

participants.” The new distinction was justified on the basis that
“[t]here may be many individuals concerned about the best
interests of a child who do not have the immediate connection to
the child that justifies treating them as parties. The intent of this
rule is to assure that such individuals are aware of the proceedings
and are available to provide information useful to the court in
29
making decisions concerning that child.”
If “immediate
connection” to the child is the justification for treating the
individual as a party, then surely the child, the subject of the
petition, has the most immediate connection and, who better than
the child has “information useful to the court in making decisions”
concerning the child? Thus, the rationale for the rule undermines
the distinction the new rule creates.
The new rule is also inconsistent with relevant statutes. For
example, under Minnesota Statute section 260C.163, subdivision 2,
“[a] child who is the subject of a petition, and the parents,
guardian, or legal custodian of the child have the right to
30
participate in all proceedings on a petition.”
Further, “[t]he
minor and the minor’s parent, guardian, or custodian are entitled
to be heard, to present evidence material to the case, and to cross31
examine witnesses appearing at the hearing.”
The right to
participate encompasses the right to be heard, to present evidence
and to cross-examine witnesses—all rights of a party under the
Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Procedure. However, unless the child
is granted party status under the new Rules of Juvenile Procedure,
the child will be denied the rights these statutes provide to the
child.
The new Rules and the statute also differ with regard to
inspection of reports and records. For example, the statute is
explicit: “[a]n attorney representing a child . . . shall be given
access to records, local social services agency files, and reports
32
which form the basis of any recommendation made to the court.”
However, the Rules limit the child’s right to inspect records in
some cases if the child is not a party to the proceeding. Minnesota
Rules of Juvenile Procedure 67.03 provides that “[p]rior to the
emergency protective care hearing, the parties shall be permitted to
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 58.01 cmt.
Id.
MINN STAT. § 260C.163, subd. 2.
Id. § 260C.163, subd. 8.
Id. § 260C.171, subd. 3.
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inspect reports or other written information or records that any
33
party intends to present at the hearing.”
Finally, Minnesota Statutes allow a child to testify outside the
34
courtroom setting “when it is in the child’s best interest to do so.”
However, because the statute does not refer to participants, a child
who is the subject of a petition and, thus, a participant cannot
move the court to receive his or her testimony outside of the
courtroom unless the child is also a party. Thus, if the child is not a
party, the child may not be able to use the very law enacted for his
or her benefit.
Thus, if the child is not a party, the child’s lawyer cannot fulfill
her responsibilities and duties to carry out the representation
under the ABA Standards of Practice for Lawyers Who Represent Children
35
in Abuse and Neglect Cases.
As defined by the ABA, the term
“child’s attorney” means a lawyer who provides legal services for a
child and who owes the same duties of undivided loyalty,
confidentiality, and competent representation to the child as is due
36
an adult client.
The basic obligations of the child’s attorney include obtaining
copies of all pleadings and relevant notices, participating in
depositions, negotiations, discovery, pretrial conferences, and
hearings and developing a theory and strategy of the case to
37
implement at hearings. The Commentary to ABA Standard B-1
states: “[T]he child’s attorney should be prepared to participate
fully in any proceedings and not merely defer to the other
38
parties.” These standards assume that the child, the subject of the
proceeding, is a party.
To ensure that the client is afforded all of the rights available
under Minnesota law and to ensure that counsel complies with his
or her obligations, counsel appointed to represent the child should
file a motion for intervention in the case. The child who is the
subject of the juvenile protection matter shall have the right to
39
intervene as a party. Setting out the procedure for intervention of
right, the Rules provide that the person with the right to intervene
shall file with the court and serve upon all parties and the county
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

MINN. R. JUV. PRO. 67.03 (emphasis added).
MINN. STAT. § 260C.163, subd. 6.
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 15.
Id. at Standard A-1.
Id. at Standard B-1.
Id. at Standard B-1 cmt.
MINN. R. JUV. PRO. 59.01, subd. 1.
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attorney a notice of intervention, which shall include the basis for a
40
claim to intervene. The court administrator shall have the notice
of intervention as a matter of right form available.
The
intervention shall be deemed accomplished upon service of the
notice of intervention, unless a party or the county attorney files
and serves written objection within ten days of the date of service.
If a written objection is timely filed and served, the court shall
41
schedule a hearing for the next available date.
Even after the court appoints counsel for the child, attorneys
for children in juvenile protection matters may find themselves
having to file and argue motions to make the child, the subject of
the juvenile proceedings, a party because some courts do not deem
the intervention of right form to be sufficient. And, even after the
child is a party, some courts have tried to limit the child’s input in
settlement negotiations. Arguing whether the child should or
should not be a party detracts from the main issues before the
juvenile court, such as termination of parental rights, sibling visits,
where and with whom the child will live, and access to services.
Recognizing the anomalous distinction between the party and
participant status of children, courts in one district have resolved
the problem by making all children, age ten and older, parties.
Noting that it made no particular sense to have the subject of the
petition be deemed a participant rather than a party, Chisago,
Isanti, Pine and Kanabec counties in the Tenth Judicial District all
have adopted a standing order for all CHIPS cases that all children
age 10 and older are deemed to be parties. This approach
42
alleviates the problem for lawyers in these counties. However, the
issue remains in other jurisdictions.
It is fair to say that in no other matter where lawyers are
required to provide effective assistance of counsel is there a
distinction between party and participant status of the client.
Given the procedural rights that flow from party status, such as
access to process, the child’s due process rights are compromised
when the child is deemed a participant. Gault is again instructive
on this issue: “Departures from established principles of due
40. Id. at 59.03, subd. 1
41. Id. While there is a presumption that intervention should be granted,
Children’s Law Center of Minnesota’s lawyers for children have had to file briefs
and argue the motion.
42. Children’s Law Center of Minnesota was successful in persuading the
court in another county to deem the child a party in the same order appointing
Children’s Law Center of Minnesota to represent the child.
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process have frequently resulted not in enlightened procedure, but
43
in arbitrariness.”
In sum, although not intended at the time the rule was
changed, the new rule making the child a participant and not a
party presents a significant barrier to the child’s access to justice.
V. EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Meaningful access to justice in juvenile protection proceedings
is realized through quality representation provided by competent
and diligent lawyers. The Standards of Practice for Lawyers Who
Represent Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases, promulgated by the
American Bar Association in 1996, grew out of concerns of child
advocates that even when children were represented, the
44
representation they received was often times inadequate.
The Standards were adopted for two main reasons: to give
guidance to aid lawyers representing children in abuse and neglect
cases and to help implement ABA resolutions on “the importance
of legal representation and the improvement of lawyer practice in
45
child protection cases.” In essence, they provide a comprehensive
guide to lawyers appointed to represent children.
The Standards contain two parts: first “the specific roles and
responsibilities of a lawyer appointed to represent a child in an
abuse and neglect case;” and second “a set of standards for judicial
administrators and trial judges to assure high quality legal
46
representation.”
The Standards make clear that the “child’s attorney” means “a
lawyer who provides legal services for a child and who owes the
same duties of undivided loyalty, confidentiality, and competent
47
representation to the child as is due an adult client.” Similarly,
the Standards explicitly recognize that the child is a separate
43.
44.

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1967).
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, AMERICA’S CHILDREN AT RISK: A NATIONAL
AGENDA FOR LEGAL ACTION 6 (1993). On the subject of representation, it stated:
“Children’s cases are often ‘processed’ not advocated, and too frequently
children’s interests are poorly represented. . . . Meaningful protection of
children’s rights requires that children be represented by highly skilled counsel at
critical stages of critical proceedings. Competent professional representation in
proceedings that involve children is vital in a system where decisions about
children’s rights and liberties and those of their parents are decided.” Id. at 7.
45. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 15, at Preface.
46. Id.
47. Id. at Standard A-1.
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individual with potentially discrete and independent views. To
ensure that the child’s independent voice is heard, the child’s
48
attorney must advocate the child’s articulated position.” Thus,
the child’s lawyer “owes traditional duties to the child as client”
49
consistent with the rules of professional conduct.
Communication with the child must be “developmentally
appropriate” which means that “the child’s attorney should ensure
the child’s ability to provide client-based directions by structuring
all communications to account for the individual child’s age, level
of education, cultural context, and degree of language
50
acquisition.”
The Standards recognize that the foundation for representing
children is “establishing and maintaining a relationship with the
51
child.”
Therefore, meeting with the child is important before
court hearings and case reviews as well as when there are “changes
in placement, school suspensions, in-patient hospitalizations, and
other similar changes. Such in-person meetings allow the lawyer to
explain to the child what is happening, what alternatives might be
52
available, and what will happen next.” The child’s lawyer must
conduct “thorough, continuing, and independent investigations
and discovery which may include, reviewing the child’s social
services, psychiatric, psychological, drug and alcohol, medical, law
53
enforcement, school, and other records relevant to the case.”
The child’s lawyer has the basic obligation to not merely be a
fact finder, but rather to zealously advocate a position on behalf of
the child. It is therefore critical that the child’s lawyer be
adequately prepared prior to hearings and that the attorney be
54
present at and actively participate in all hearings.
Thus, the lawyer should:
1. Obtain copies of all pleadings and relevant notices;
2. Participate in depositions, negotiations, discovery,
pretrial conferences, and hearings;
3. Inform other parties and their representatives that he
or she is representing the child and expects reasonable

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at Standard A-1 cmt.
Id.
Id. at Standard A-3.
Id. at Standard C-1
Id. at Standard C-1 cmt.
Id. at Standard C-2.
Id. at Standard C-2, Standard B-1 cmt.
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notification prior to case conferences, changes of
placement, and other changes of circumstances affecting
the child and the child’s family;
4. Attempt to reduce case delays and ensure that the
court recognizes the need to speedily promote
permanency for the child;
5. Counsel the child concerning the subject matter of the
litigation, the child’s rights, the court system, the
proceedings, the lawyer’s role, and what to expect in the
legal process;
6. Develop a theory and strategy of the case to implement
at hearings, including factual and legal issues; and
7. Identify appropriate family and professional resources
55
for the child.
The Standards are also explicit about the duties of the lawyer
with regard to hearings: “The child’s attorney should attend all
hearings and participate in all telephone or other conferences with
56
the court.” In addition,
the child’s attorney should make appropriate motions,
including motions in limine and evidentiary objections, to
advance the child’s position at trial or during other
hearings. If necessary, the child’s attorney should file
briefs in support of evidentiary issues. Further, during all
hearings, the child’s attorney should preserve legal issues
57
for appeal, as appropriate.
Finally, “the child’s attorney should present and cross examine
witnesses, offer exhibits, and provide independent evidence as
58
necessary.”
The Standards also counsel that the child “should be present at
significant court hearings, regardless of whether the child will
59
testify.” The Commentary explains that the child has a right to
“meaningful participation in the case . . . and the child’s presence
underscores for the judge that the child is a real party in interest in
60
the case.”
In addition, the Standards explain that even when “[t]he
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at Standard B-1.
Id. at Standard D-1.
Id. at Standard D-3.
Id. at Standard D-4.
Id. at Standard D-5.
Id. at Standard D-5 cmt.
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child’s position . . . overlaps with the positions of one or both
parents, third-party caretakers, or a child protection agency, . . . the
child’s attorney should be prepared to participate fully in every
hearing and not merely defer to the other parties. Any identity of
position should be based on the merits of the position . . . and not
61
a mere endorsement of another party’s position.”
After the hearing, the lawyer “should review all written orders
to ensure that they conform with the court’s verbal orders and
62
statutorily required findings and notices.”
Furthermore, the
lawyer should discuss the order and its consequences with the
63
child.
Thus, the Standards are an indispensable tool for lawyers in
providing effective assistance of counsel to children in juvenile
64
protection proceedings.
VI. CONCLUSION
Because what happens in court shapes the child’s future,
65
access to effective assistance of counsel matters most. On a daily
basis, judges make difficult decisions that affect the lives of children
of all ages, races and cultures; it is, therefore, reasonable to assume
that hearing from the lawyers who speak on behalf of these
children is helpful in making those decisions. Thus, providing
children with “high quality representation,” as provided by the ABA
Standards, is imperative. Without such representation, the child’s
access to justice is an empty promise.

61. Id. at Standard D-4 cmt.
62. Id. at Standard E-1.
63. Id. at Standard E-2.
64. The ABA STANDARDS also describe the role of the judiciary in enhancing
the legal representation for children including assuring independence of the
child’s attorney, assisting in the training of lawyers, assuring adequate
compensation of children’s lawyers and authorizing lawyer access to files. Id. at
Part II—Enhancing the Judicial Role in Child Representation.
65. See Bruce A. Green & Bernardine Dohrn, Foreword: Children and the Ethical
Practice of Law, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281 (1996).
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